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Abstract
In Part I, this Note elaborates on the rights that indigenous persons have to ancestral land
and the sources of international law that support those rights. Part I also discusses the alternative
dispute resolution process of mediation and the customary discouragement of mediation between
parties with a power imbalance. Part II explores whether the Negev Bedouins and Israeli government should pursue mediation to resolve their land dispute and generally addresses techniques
used to monitor mediation sessions between parties with a power imbalance. Part III explores why
mediation is better suited to resolve the Israeli government-Negev Bedouin land dispute than is
courtroom litigation.

MEDIATION TO RESOLVE THE BEDOUINISRAELI GOVERNMENT DISPUTE FOR THE
NEGEV DESERT
Sarah S. Matari *
"Inquireof your companion before choosing the route.'
-Bedouin Proverb
.....
............................
INTRODUCTION
I. LAW GOVERNING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND
MEDIATION CUSTOM IN THE CONTEXT OF
.............
A PARTY POWER IMBALANCE
.....
A. Law Governing Indigenous Rights......
1. International Conventions and Treaties
Support Indigenous Persons' Claims to
..........................
Ancestral Land
Law Supports
International
2. Customary
Indigenous Persons' Claims to Ancestral
Land..................................1099
3. General International Legal Principles
Support Indigenous Persons' Claims to
........
Ancestral Land ..................
B. Mediation Custom and Party Power
................................
Imbalance
OF
THE
POWER IMBALANCE
LIGHT
II. IN
BETWEEN THE PARTIES, IS MEDIATION A
RESPONSIBLE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
.......
...........................
PROCESS?
A. The Power Imbalance between the Israeli
Government and the Negev Bedouins ...............

1091

1094
1095

1096

1103
1105

1109
1110

* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Fordham University School of Law; B.S. in Philosophy and
Middle Eastern Studies, 2007, Smith College. The author would like to thank her family
for their unwavering support, Fordham University School of Law Professors Eric Jensen
and Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Liz Shura, justice Richard Goldstone, and UNDP Senior
Officer Timothy Rothermel for their invaluable guidance, and the children of Al-Walaja,
West Bank for the direction they have given her. All omissions and opinions expressed
herein are the author's.
1. CLINTON BAILEY, A CULTURE OF DESERT SURVIVAL: BEDOUIN PROVERBS
FROM SINAI AND THE NEGEV 171 (2004) (compiling Bedouin proverbs that the
author discovered during his twenty-five years of studying Bedouin culture).

1089

1090 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 34:1089
B. Is Proposing Mediation at Odds with the
Mediation Custom that Discourages
Mediation between Parties with a Power
Imbalance?
..................................
1115
C. Institutional Support for Mediation to Resolve
the Israeli Government-Negev Bedouin
Dispute and State-Indigenous Disputes
Generally ...... .........
.................
1118
1. In the Public Interest Sector, the
Consensus Building Institute Advocates for
Mediation to Resolve the Israeli
Government-Negev Bedouin Dispute............1118
2. Large Transnational Organizations
Support Mediation for State-Indigenous
Disputes...............................1120
3. State Legislative Bodies Use Mediation to
Resolve State-Indigenous Disputes ...........
1122
3. Transnational and State Judicial Systems
Encourage State and Indigenous Parties to
Pursue Mediation to Resolve Their Disputes......1123
III. THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND THE
NEGEV BEDOUINS SHOULD PURSUE
MEDIATION TO RESOLVE THEIR DISPUTE
FOR THE NEGEEV DESERT.....................1125
A. Courts Are Unable to Address Issues that Are
.................. 1126
Imperative to Reconciliation
B. The Adversarial Court System Is Ill-Suited to
Address Indigenous Needs .................
1126
C. Litigation Is Not Inherent to the Bedouin
Community and Indigenous Way of Life..................1127
D. Litigation Is Costly for and Often Disappoints
Indigenous Communities ..................... 1128
CONCLUSION
........................................
1129

2011] MEDIATION TO RESOLVE NEGEVDESERT DISPUTE 1091
INTRODUCTION
The United Nations ("UN") Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues estimates that there are more than 370
million indigenous persons worldwide.2 Indigenous persons
are often defined as those having traditional lifestyles and
residing on ancestral land.3 Though native persons reside
on lands that their ancestors have passed down for
generations, the states that emerge on ancestral land often
create systems of land ownership in which indigenous
persons are not participants. In the resulting conflict of
ownership, state governments often attempt to disrupt
native ways of life and unilaterally control land that
indigenous persons perceive to be their own. 4
State governments are naturally wealthier and more
powerful than indigenous communities.5 Therefore, when
conflict arises between a state government and an
indigenous population, the government party is able to
exert control over the indigenous party and dominate the
processes that adjudicate indigenous persons' rights. 6
The Negev Desert, a region in southern Israel, is home
to over 50,000 Negev Bedouins who maintain villages on
their ancestral land.7 The Negev Bedouins have not
successfully secured government-recognized land rights to

2. See About

UNPFII, UNITED

NATIONS

[UN]

PERMANENT

FORUM

ON

INDIGENOUS
ISSUES,
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/history.html
(last visited Mar. 13, 2011); see also Press Release, UN News Centre, United
Nations Adopts Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007),
available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=23794 [hereinafter
UN Adopts Declaration].
3. See infra Part L.A (explaining that indigenous persons have a connection to
the land on which they live, preserve a sense of cultural, social, linguistic and
economic identity, and descend from pre-colonial inhabitants of the land).
4. See infra Part LA (referencing examples of state-indigenous land disputes in
which the state government opposes indigenous claims for land).
5. See infra Part I.B (providing that disputes between state governments and
indigenous groups are difficult to resolve due to the power imbalance between the
parties).
6. See infra Part IL.A (highlighting how the position of, and arguments advanced by,
a state government are often supported by domestic legal principles that govern
adjudication processes).
7. See infra Part II.A (discussing the struggle for land between Israel and the
indigenous Bedouin Arab population, and explaining that this area has been the
main grazing and habitation ground for the Bedouin Arabs for centuries).
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the desert their ancestors have lived on for centuries and
have passed down to them.8 The indigenous Bedouin
population and the Israeli government compete for the
Negev Desert in the sense that each party envisions a
different use for the Negev. The Bedouins wish to live,
cultivate, and graze on the land, as their ancestors did; the
Israeli government would prefer to develop the land into
prime real estate.9 Due to the actions of both parties, the
conflict has escalated in recent years; particularly, the
Israeli government has demolished Bedouin homes and
destroyed hundreds of acres of Bedouin-grown crops in an
effort to convince the Bedouin population to respect
government policies and relocate from their ancestral
land.'0
In 2007, the Consensus Building Institute ("CBI'),
after conducting field research in the region, proposed that
the Israeli government and Negev Bedouin community
pursue mediation to resolve their dispute for land."
Mediation is a short-term, structured, task-oriented, and
("ADR")
participatory alternative dispute resolution
process in which parties and a neutral third-party mediator
work toward the resolution of a conflict.12 According to
mediation custom, however, parties with a relationship that
is characterized by hostility and an imbalance of power are
discouraged from pursuing mediation 3 because the more
powerful party may intentionally, or even unintentionally,

8. See infra Part II.A (providing that Bedouins have not been successful in
their land claims and have no state-recognized rights to the lands on which they
reside).
9. See infra Part II.A (explaining the Bedouins' desire to remain on ancestral lands
and the government's desire to develop this land into prime real estate).
10. See infra Part IL.A (discussing the Israeli government and its recent decision to
destroy Bedouin homes and crops in an effort to convince the Bedouin community to
relocate from their ancestral land).
11. See infra Part II.B (discussing the Consensus Building Institute's
recommendation that the parties mediate their land dispute).
12. See infra Part LB (defining the alternative dispute resolution process of
mediation as a short term, structured, task-oriented, participatory process in
which parties and a neutral third party mediator work toward the resolution of a
conflict).
13. See infra Part LB (discussing the negative effects of a power imbalance on
mediation parties).
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control the mediation process, precluding a fair and safe
mediation process. 14
This Note examines whether the Negev Bedouins and
the Israeli government should pursue mediation to resolve
their land dispute, given that the existing power imbalance
begs the question of whether reaching a fair settlement is
possible. For insight into the use of mediation for parties
that have a deep-rooted power imbalance, this Note draws
on the use of mediation in another context involving
persistent
power
imbalances:
partnerships
among
individuals with a history of domestic violence. Although
domestic relationships are not strictly analogous to the
relationship between a state and an indigenous population,
victims of domestic violence and indigenous persons face
similar obstacles in pursuing mediation. A victim of
domestic violence, like an indigenous population, may
hesitate to represent his or her true feelings and concerns
in fear of the abusive party, and therefore lose bargaining
power during the mediation session. However, mediation
customs also reveal that if mediators are prepared to
safeguard the weaker party's rights and employ premediation screening and safe mediation techniques
throughout the process, parties with a power imbalance
need not avoid mediation. 5 Given that safe mediation
methods are available for parties with a power imbalance
and the notable inadequacies of litigation in the context of
upholding indigenous population's rights, this Note
encourages
the
Negev Bedouins
and the Israeli
government to pursue mediation to resolve their dispute
over the Negev Desert.
In Part I, this Note elaborates on the rights that
indigenous persons have to ancestral land and the sources
of international law that support those rights. Part I also
discusses the alternative dispute resolution process of
14. See infra Part I.B (elaborating on the ways in which a party power imbalance
may preclude a fair mediation process and explaining how a historically inferior and
subordinate party to a mediation would be disadvantaged in mediation with the more
powerful and abusive party).
15. See infra Part II.C (discussing the movement for mediation screening methods
and safe techniques to improve mediation sessions between parties with a power
imbalance).
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mediation and the customary discouragement of mediation
between parties with a power imbalance. Part II explores
whether the Negev Bedouins and Israeli government
should pursue mediation to resolve their land dispute and
generally addresses techniques used to monitor mediation
sessions between parties with a power imbalance. Part III
explores why mediation is better suited to resolve the Israeli
government-Negev Bedouin land dispute than is courtroom
litigation.

I. LAW GOVERNING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND
MEDIATION CUSTOM IN THE CONTEXT OFA PARTY
POWER IMBALANCE
Exploration of whether the Israeli government and
Negev Bedouins should pursue mediation to resolve their
land dispute rests, in part, on the legal foundations of
indigenous land rights. Accordingly, Part I discusses the
ways in which indigenous land rights are rooted in primary
sources of international law, i.e., the sources of law that are
recognized by Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ").16 International conventions,
international custom, and general principles of law 7 all
support indigenous persons' right to land. 8 It follows that
16. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, T.S. No. 993 (stating that the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") is to decide
disputes in accordance with international law and shall apply international conventions,
customary law, general principles of law, and judicial decisions to determine the
outcome of disputes).
17. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102, reporters notes 1 (1987) (explaining that "Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court ofJustice, a provision commonly treated as an
authoritative statement of the 'sources' of international law" notes international
conventions, international customs, and general principles of law as sources of
international law).
18. See, e.g., Lillian Aponte Miranda, Uploading the Local: Assessing the
Contemporary Relationship between Indigenous Peoples' Land Tenure Systems and
InternationalHuman Rights Law Regarding the Allocation of TraditionalLands and
Resources in Latin America, 10 OR. REV. INT'L L. 419, 434 (2008) ("[Ilnternational
law developments [suggest that] indigenous peoples are subject to special
human rights protections with respect to their traditional lands and resources.");
see also Russel Lawrence Barsh, Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to
Subject of InternationalLaw?, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS.J. 33, 33-35 (1994) (tracing the
"growing acceptance of indigenous peoples' collective identity and distinct
rights in international law and practice").

2011] MEDIATION TO RESOLVE NEGEVDESERT DISPUTE 1095
indigenous persons may rely on a variety of international
law sources to claim rights to ancestral land.
In addition, Part I raises the question of how to best
address indigenous property rights and indigenous
persons' claims to property by highlighting the alternative
dispute resolution practice of mediation in this context. To
reach the question of whether mediation practice is
appropriate in the context of a state-indigenous land
dispute, this Note will examine the use of established
mediation customs to address disputes between parties with
a history of domestic violence.19
A.

Law GoverningIndigenous Rights

Before this Section discusses the international law that
provides a basis for indigenous land rights, it will first
define who qualifies as indigenous
persons. The
international community has yet to clearly state whom
indigenous rights protect or to agree on a definition of
"indigenous." 20
Though the international community may not be able
to rely on a unanimously agreed upon definition,
commonalities arise between the various conceptions of
what it means to be "indigenous." Most definitions
highlight that indigenous persons (1) have a connection to
the land on which they reside; (2) preserve a sense of
cultural, social, and economic identity; and (3) descend
from pre-colonial inhabitants of the land.2 ' The official
19. See infra Part I.B (discussing the mediation custom that discourages parties with
a power imbalance from pursuing mediation).
20. SeeJohn Alan Cohan, EnvironmentalRights of Indigenous Peoples under the
Alien Tort Claims Act, the Public Trust Doctrine and Corporate Ethics, and
Environmental Dispute Resolution, 20 UCLAJ. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 133, 136 (2001)
("No agreed-upon definition of the term 'indigenous peoples' exists."); see also
Sompong Sucharitkul, The Inter-Temporal Character of International and
Comparative Law Regarding the Rights of the Indigenous Populations of the World, 50
AM. J. COMP. L. 3, 6 (2002) (explaining that "indigenousness" is not clearly
defined, and highlighting that the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples did not attempt to define "indigenous peoples").
21. See, e.g., Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries art. 1, June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 [hereinafter ILO
Convention] (suggesting that indigenous protection be afforded to persons that
have a connection to the land on which they live, preserve a sense of cultural,
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United Nations' definition of "indigenous" relies on some
of the above characteristics and additionally makes use of
the following criterion: indigenous persons self-identify as
indigenous, enjoy a historical continuity, are a nondominant population, reside on ancestral territories, and
preserve an ethnic identity.2 2
Using these definitions of what it means to be
indigenous, the following sub-sections discuss the sources
of international law that support indigenous rights to land:
international conventions and treaty law, customary
international
legal
law, and
general
international
principles.
1.

International Conventions and Treaties Support Indigenous
Persons' Claims to Ancestral Land

A number of conventions and treaties create grounds for
indigenous claims to ancestral land. These instruments either
safeguard the right to self-determination, assist indigenous
persons to maintain their culture and way of life, or specifically
advocate for indigenous persons' right to land.23 To highlight but
social, and economic identity, and descend from pre-colonial inhabitants of the
land); Cohan, supra note 20, at 136 (stating that most define indigenous persons
as persons who "descend from pre-colonial inhabitants" of the land, have a
connection to the land on which they live, and "maintain a strong sense of
cultural, social, economic and linguistic identity").
22. See Special Rapporteur of the Sub-commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Study of the Problem of Discrimination
U.N.
Doc.
379-80,
it
Indigenous
Populations,
against
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4 (Vol. V) (1987) (byJos6 R. Martinez Cobo); see
also Carlo Osi, UnderstandingIndigenous Dispute Resolution Processes and Western
Alternative Dispute Resolution Cultivating Culturally Appropriate Methods in Lieu of
Litigation, 10 CARDOZOJ. CONFLICT RESOL. 163, 172 (2008) (noting that the UN
looks at the characteristics of self-identification, historical continuity, nondominance, ancestral territories, and ethnic identity to define "indigenous");
Rachael Grad, Note, Indigenous Rights and Intellectual Property Law: A Comparison
of the United States & Australia, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 203, 204 (2002)
(explaining that the UN uses the characteristics of historical continuity, nondominance, ancestral territories, and ethnic identity to define "indigenous").
23. See U.N. Charter art. 1 (affirming that the right of self-determination for
all people rests on their ability to freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development); ILO
Convention, supra note 21, art. 1 (serving as the foremost convention to
specifically address the need for indigenous rights and to outline the
responsibilities of governments in promoting and protecting the human rights
and traditions of indigenous persons); International Covenant on Civil and
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Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20 (1978), 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (creating collective rights for ethnic,
religious, or linguistic minorities within states by stating that such "minorities
shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or
to use their own language"); International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19 (1978), 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] ("The States Parties to the present Covenant
undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will
be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status."); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination art. 1, Dec. 21, 1965, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-18 (1978), 660
U.N.T.S. 195 (protecting against racial discrimination, and defining racial
discrimination as "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an
equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life"); United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples art. 10, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N.
Doc. A/61/L.67 (Sept. 7, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP] ("Indigenous peoples
shall not be forcibly removed from their lands or territories. No relocation shall
take place without the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous
peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and,
where possible, with the option of return."); Declaration on the Rights of
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities arts.
1-4, G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. Doc. A/Res/47/135 (Feb. 3, 1993) (addressing the
rights of minorities and states' obligations to help minorities preserve "national
or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity," to ensure that minorities
have the freedom of expression and the ability to develop their culture, to
associate and organize among themselves, to participate in decisions regarding
the minority, to exercise minority rights, both individual and in groups, and to
education about minorities); Universal Declaration of Human Rights arts. 1-2,
G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, U.N. Doc A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (asserting the
view that all human beings are equal and entitled to rights regardless of "race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status"); International Conference on
Population and Development, Sept. 5-13, 1994, Report of the International
Conference on Population and Development, 1 6.27, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13
(Oct. 18, 1994) ("Governments should respect the cultures of indigenous
people and enable them to have tenure and manage their lands, protect and
restore the natural resources and ecosystems on which indigenous communities
depend for their survival and well-being and, in consultation with indigenous
people, take this into account in the formulation of national population and
development policies."); World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25,
1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 1 20, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993) (recognizing the "inherent dignity and the
unique contribution of indigenous people to the development and plurality of
society and strongly reaffirm[ing] the commitment of the international
community to their economic, social and cultural well-being and their
enjoyment of the fruits of sustainable development. States should ensure the full
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a few of these conventions, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights of 1976 created collective rights
for ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities within states by
pronouncing that such minorities should not be denied the
right, in community with the other members of their
group, to enjoy their culture, including cultural practices
that make use of ancestral land.24 In the same year, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights created collective economic and cultural rights for
minority populations within a state. 25 More recently, the UN
International Conference on Population and Development
agreed that indigenous peoples should be granted rights to
the land on which they reside and the natural resources
and ecosystems on which indigenous persons depend. 26 In 2007,
the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
declared that states shall not forcibly remove indigenous
persons from their lands, nor relocate indigenous persons
without obtaining "the free, prior, and informed consent of
the indigenous persons affected."2 7 The conventions and
treaties described are among the number of conventions
and treaties that support the claim that indigenous persons
have rights to ancestral land.

and free participation of indigenous people in all aspects of society, in particular
in matters of concern to them.").
24. See ICCPR,supra note 23, art. 27 (creating collective rights for ethnic, religious,
or linguistic minorities within states by stating that such minorities shall not be denied
the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language).
25. See ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 2 (creating economic, social, and cultural
collective rights for populations within a state).
26. See Report of United Nations InternationalConference on Population and Development,

supra note 23, 1[ 6.27 (affirming that indigenous peoples should be able to have
rights to the land on which they reside, and to protect the natural resources and
ecosystems on which they depend).
27. See UNDRIP, supra note 23, art. 10 ("Indigenous peoples shall not be
forcibly removed from their lands or territories. No relocation shall take place
without the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous peoples
concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where
possible, with the option of return.").
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2.

Customary International Law Supports Indigenous
Persons' Claims to Ancestral Land

In addition to international conventions and treaties,
customary international law supports indigenous persons'
right to land. Customary international law is governed by
state practice and opinio juriS28-the international doctrine
that stipulates that a state must have acted under a legal
obligation for the action to contribute to customary law.29
Customary law has contributed to the development of
specific rights for indigenous persons and serves as another
source of protection for indigenous persons.
Setting the stage for the creation of customary
international law, the UN Economic and Social Council, in
1982, established the Working Group on Indigenous
Populations,3 0 a group comprised of experts on human
rights protection.3 1 The establishment of such a group
demonstrated that international institutions had an
increased interest in exploring the unique predicaments of
native populations and in protecting their rights. This
interest to protect the rights of indigenous persons grew
more explicit when the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights issued a groundbreaking decision for indigenous
claimants. Mayagna Community of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua
is a case in which the Mayagna Awas Tingni indigenous
community alleged that Nicaragua failed to protect their
28. See Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 1 27 (June 3) ("It
is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be
looked for primarily in the actual practice and opiniojuris ofStates . . . .").
29. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1201 (9th ed. 2009) (defining opinio juris as
"[t]he principle that for conduct or a practice to become a rule of customary
international law, it must be shown that nations believe that international law (rather
than moral obligation) mandates the conduct or practice").
30. See United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Persons, UN
PERMANENT FORUM ON INDIGENOUS ISSUES, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/
en/declaration.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2011) ("In 1982 the Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) established the Working Group on Indigenous Populations
(WGIP) with the mandate to develop a set of minimum standards that would
protect indigenous peoples.").
31. See Working Group on Indigenous Populations, OFFICE OF THE UN HIGH
COMMISSIONER

FOR

HUMAN

RIGHTS,

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/

indigenous/groups/wgip.htm#mandate (last visited Mar. 13, 2011) ("The Working
Group is composed of five experts from the Sub-Commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights.").
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indigenous rights to own ancestral land.3 2 This case is the
first international decision to recognize the communal
property rights of indigenous persons.3 3 The Awas Tingni
court recognized that, in the absence of real title to
property, indigenous persons may use possession of land as
a sufficient basis for their claims to property.3 4 Ultimately,
the court held that indigenous persons may obtain staterecognized property rights even though they lack
traditional real title documents.3 5 The decision led the way
for others like it, and the legal community has since relied
on the Awas Tingni decision as persuasive legal authority in
the arena of indigenous property rights.3 6
32. See Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua (Awas Tingni),
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79,
2
(Aug. 31, 2001); see also id. 1 148 ("[I]t is the opinion of [the] Court that article
21 of the Convention protects the right to property in a sense which includes,
among others, the rights of members of the indigenous communities within the
framework of communal property . . . ").
33. See LeonardoJ. Alvarado, Prospects and Challenges in the Implementations of
Indigenous Peoples' Human Rights in InternationalLaw: Lessons from the Case of Awas
Tingni vs. Nicaragua, 24 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 609, 609 (2007) ("Mayagna
(Sumo) Community of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua is the first judgment by an
international tribunal to recognize the communal property rights of indigenous
peoples and to also mandate a state to protect those rights. The Awas Tingni case
has represented an important landmark for indigenous peoples in the Americas
and beyond . . . ."); see also Claudio Grossman, The Inter-American System of
Human Rights: Challenges for the Future, 83 IND. L.J. 1267, 1278 (2008) ("The
Court's decision in the case of the Awas Tingni community was the first
international decision to recognize the right to communal property.").
34. See Awas Tingni, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, 1 151 ("[P]ossession
of the land should suffice for indigenous communities lacking real title to
property of land to obtain official recognition to that property, and for
consequent registration.").
35. See id.
36. See Alvarado, supra note 33, at 643 (describing how the Awas Tingni
decision established international legal precedent in the domain of indigenous
property rights); see, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Comty. v. Paraguay, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146,
128
(Mar. 29, 2006), (holding that "traditional possession of ... lands by indigenous
people has equivalent effects to those of a state-granted full property title ...
[and] traditional possession entitles indigenous people to demand official
recognition and registration of property title"); Maya Indigenous Cmtys. of the
Toledo Dist. v. Belize, Case No. 12.053, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1, 1 142 (2004) (holding that the
"central elements to the protection of indigenous property rights is the
requirement that states undertake effective and fully informed consultations
with indigenous communities regarding acts or decisions that may affect their
traditional territories" and ensuring that decisions affecting indigenous land are
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Persistent international efforts to promote the customary
land rights of indigenous persons culminated in the UN General
Assembly's decision to adopt the United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples ("UNDRIP").37 The UNDRIP is
a foundational document for indigenous rights,3 8 and its passage
revealed that an overwhelming number of states support
indigenous property rights: 143 countries approved the
document and only four opposed it.39 Since the initial vote,
however, the four opposing states have endorsed the document;
in December 2010, the United States was the final country to do
so.40

Though the UNDRIP does not bind states, it reinforces and
supports state decisions to pursue more just standards for
indigenous populations.4 1 Affirming that indigenous persons
have a right to self-determination, the UNDRIP contends that by
"based upon a process of fully informed consent on the part of the indigenous
community as a whole"); Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. Comm'n
H.R., Report No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1, 1 129 (2002)
(applying the same interpretation the Inter-American system used in Awas
Tingni to hold that international instruments, though not yet approved by the
OAS or the United States, may be called upon to apply the provisions of other
human rights instruments within the context of indigenous rights).
37. See Osi, supra note 22, at 177 ("As part of the ongoing efforts to
acknowledge and promote the rights of Indigenous or Aboriginal peoples ...
there has been a strong lobby for the UN to confront these issues. On
September 13, 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples."); see also UN Adopts
Declaration, supra note 2 ("[T]he importance of this document for indigenous
peoples and, more broadly, for the human rights agenda, cannot be
underestimated. By adopting the Declaration, we are also taking another major
step forward towards the promotion and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all." (quoting UN General Assembly President
Sheikha Haya)).
38. See Osi, supra note 22, at 177; UN Adopts Declaration, supra note 2
(explaining the significance of the UNDRIP for indigenous persons).
39. See UN Adopts Declaration, supranote 2.
40. See Press Release, UN News Centre, United States' Backing for Indigenous
Rights Treaty Hailed at UN (Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://www.un.org/apps/
news/printnewsAr.asp?nid=37102 ("With its announcement, the US has nowjoined
the other three countries in endorsing the treaty . . . ").
41. See United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Persons, UN
PERMANENT FORUM ON INDIGENOUS ISSUES, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/
en/declaration.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2011) ("[T]he [UNDRIP] will not be legally
binding for Member States. Nevertheless, it will have a major effect on indigenous
peoples worldwide in regards to their rights."); see also UN Adopts Declaration, supra
note 2 (noting that the UNDRIP does not bind states but nevertheless is evident of and
encourages international progress in the indigenous rights domain).
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virtue of this right, indigenous persons have the right to social,
economic, and cultural development. 42 The UNDRIP elaborates
on these rights and explains that among others, indigenous
persons are entitled to strengthen their own institutions and
cultures, and during these processes, stay true to their indigenous
traditions.43 The UNDRIP prohibits discrimination against
indigenous peoples and urges states to not only permit, but invite
indigenous persons to participate in all matters that concern
them, including land rights issues.44
Specifically, Articles 8 and 10 of the UNDRIP address
indigenous persons' right to property. 45 Article 8 protects
indigenous persons from forced assimilation or destruction of
their culture, and calls for states to establish mechanisms to
prevent acts that would compromise indigenous lifestyles and
divest indigenous persons of their land. 4 6 Article 10 asserts that
indigenous persons should not be forcibly removed from their
lands, nor relocated without free, prior, and informed consent,
as well as just compensation.4 7 The committee work, legal
decisions, and declaration discussed above support the notion
that the international community has demonstrated an interest
in protecting the land rights of indigenous persons, and

42. See UNDRIP, supra note 23, art. 3 ("Indigenous peoples have the right to selfdetermination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.").
43. See id. art. 11(1) ("Indigenous peoples have the right to practice and revitalize
their cultural traditions and customs.").
44. See id. art. 2 (stating that indigenous persons "have the right to be free from any
kind of discrimation); id. arts. 18, 19 (state that indigenous persons have the right to
participate in processes that may effect them and their legal rights).
45. See id. arts. 8, 10 (asserting that states should prevent and rectify any actions
that would dispossess or deprive indigenous persons of their land).
46. See id. art. 8(2) ("States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention
of, and redress for: (a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them
of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic
identities; (b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of
their lands, territories or resources; (c) Any form of forced population transfer
which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights; (d)
Any form of forced assimilation or integration; (e) Any form of propaganda
designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination directed against
them.").
47. See id. art. 10 ("Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their
lands or territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed
consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair
compensation and, where possible, with the option of return.").
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continues to create a basis for indigenous land rights within
customary international law.48
3.

General International Legal Principles Support
Indigenous Persons' Claims to Ancestral Land

General international legal principles are legal principles
49
that are common to a large number of systems of municipal law.
The Inter-American Commission, a human rights protection
entity of the Organization of American States,50 agrees that
general international legal principles support indigenous
persons' right to land.5 ' The Inter-American Commission
provided the following ruling in response to a petition for title to
Shoshone Native American ancestral lands:
[T]he [Inter-American] Commission considers that
general international legal principles applicable in the
context of indigenous human rights to include: the
right of indigenous peoples to legal recognition of their
varied and specific forms and modalities of their
control, ownership, use and enjoyment of territories
and property; the recognition of their property and
ownership rights with respect to lands, territories and
resources they have historically occupied; and where
property and user rights of indigenous peoples arise
from rights existing prior to the creation of a state,
recognition by that state of the permanent and
inalienable title of indigenous peoples relative thereto
and to have such title changed only by mutual consent
48. See Lorie M. Graham, Resolution of Claims to Self Determination: The
Expansion and Creation of Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, 10 ILSAJ. INT'L & COMP.
L. 385, 418 (2004) ("An abundance of activity around indigenous people's rights
has unfolded at the UN and elsewhere during the last 25 years . . . ."); see also
Osi, supra note 22, at 177.
49. See ICJ Statute, supra note 16, art. 38 (stating that general principles of law are
those that are recognized by civilized nations); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(4) ("General principles [are]

).
common to the major legal systems ....
50. See What is the IACHR?, INTER-AM. COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS,,
http://www.cidh.oas.org/what.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2011) ("The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) is one of two bodies in the inter-American
system for the promotion and protection of human rights . .. Its mandate is found in the
[Organization of American States] Charter and the American Convention on Human
Rights.").
51. See Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report
No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1, 1 130 (2002).
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between the state and respective indigenous peoples
when they have full knowledge and appreciation of the
nature or attributes of such property. This also implies
the right to fair compensation in the event that such
property and user rights are irrevocably lost.52
Given that the Inter-American Commission represents its
member states, the ruling stands for the proposition that a
number of states consider general international legal
principles to be a source of protection for indigenous land
rights and a show of support for the notion that indigenous
persons have the right to participate in government
processes that effect their rights to land.
Indigenous rights to ancestral land continue to
develop in,
and are
supported
by, international
conventions and treaty law, customary law, and general
international legal principles. It follows that indigenous
persons may rely on a variety of international law sources to
claim rights to the ancestral land on which they reside. The
Negev Bedouins accordingly have a strong legal basis to
claim rights to ancestral land and participate in processes
that affect their status as indigenous persons. Given this
recognized right to ancestral land, this Note argues that the
Israeli government should involve the Bedouins in decision
making rather than unilaterally decide the fate of the
Negev Bedouins. In this collective effort, the alternative
dispute resolution process of mediation may assist the
Israeli government and Negev Bedouins to communicate
effectively and reach consensus on this issue. However, as
will be examined in Part II, the Israeli government has
arguably used its power and resources to exert control over
the Bedouin population in an effort to encourage the
Bedouin population to respect state policies. Given the
possible imbalance of power between the state and
indigenous party, the following Section discusses mediation
generally and questions whether mediation is a suitable
process for parties with a persistent power imbalance.

52. Id.
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B.

Mediation Custom and PartyPower Imbalance

State governments often oppose land right claims by
indigenous persons. Because states have more resources and
power than indigenous populations, governments are in a better
position to exert control over the indigenous party in a dispute,
therefore the disputing parties are likely to experience a power
imbalance during mediation processes.5 3 This Section discusses
whether mediation is generally suitable for parties that
experience a power imbalance before reaching the question of
whether to resolve the Israeli government-Bedouin land dispute
by mediation.
ADR refers to a range of processes that parties may employ
to resolve disputes outside of a courtroom or the adversarial
system 54 ; such processes have gained, and continue to gain,
popularity among practitioners and disputants. 5 5 The benefits of
ADR processes as compared to more traditional adversarial
processes are many, as ADR enables parties to efficiently manage
and resolve disputes at a minimal cost, and offers parties the
option of avoiding contentious court processes that are likely to
have adverse effects on their relationships.5 6 Parties engaging in

53. See Eileen Luna-Firebaugh, 'Att Hascu 'Am 0 'I-oi? What DirectionShould
We Take?: The Desert People's Approach to the Militariazationof the Border, 19 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL'Y 339, 362 (advising the indigenous tribes of North America to
unite to combat the power imbalance held by their respective federal
governments); see generally Andrea Gaye McCallum, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
in the Resolution of Comprehensive Aboriginal Claims: Power Imbalance Between
Aboriginal Claimants and Governments, 2 MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC J.L. (1995),
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v2nl/mccallum21.html
(discussing how
disputes between different cultures are difficult to resolve, especially when the
parties consist of an Aboriginal group and a state government, as the state party
is more powerful than the Aboriginal group).
54. SeeJACQUELINE NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN A

NUTSHELL 2 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing how alternative dispute resolution is an
umbrella term for a number of less adversarial resolution processes).
55. See, e.g., id. at 8 ("Over the last two decades, we have seen the beginning
of a systematic implementation of ADR in the legal system . . . ."); see also
Christopher J. Marchand, Arbitration and Long-Term Health Care, 38 MD. B.J. 32,
34 (2005) ("In general, alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") is an increasingly
popular process employed to resolve disputes between feuding parties who
would otherwise end up embroiled in lengthier and more costly litigation in the
civil courts.").
56. See 4 AM. JUR. 2D, Alternative Dispute Resolution § 1 (2010) ("[ADR]
mechanisms may be less expensive, faster, less intimidating, more sensitive to the
disputants' concerns, and more responsive to the underlying problems.").
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the ADR process of mediation are more likely to maintain
amicable relations in the aftermath of the dispute, due to the
presence of a neutral third-party mediator who assists the parties
in communicating effectively.5 7 By definition, mediation is a
"short-term, structured, task-oriented, participatory intervention
process" in which parties and a neutral third-party mediator work
toward the resolution of a conflict.5 8 The mediator assists the
parties to resolve their conflict, though ultimately, the parties
shape the final agreement.5 9 The presence of a neutral thirdparty mediator is especially useful for parties that do not share
the same culture, as the parties may call on the mediator to help
them communicate in culturally sensitive ways and in a manner
that would resonate best with the opposing party.60
Mediation is unlike adversarial litigation in a number of
ways: (1) parties who opt to resolve their disputes in court have a
decision imposed on them;6' (2) the parties to mediation shape

57. See GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION, NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION,

AND OTHER PROCESSES 108 (5th ed. 2007) ("Some commentators view
mediation in all contexts as valuable primarily to enhance the parties' 'selfdetermination and party interaction or engagement' and to help the parties'
communication so that they understand and appreciate each other's
(quoting ROBERT A.
perspectives ...
and 'bridge human differences' ....
BARUCH BUSH &JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION 22, 95 (2005));
see also NOLAN-HALEY, supra note 54, at 4 ([T]he mediation process ... is known
to work well where parties have an on-going or prior relationship.").
58. See NOLAN-HALEY, supra note 54, at 70 ("Mediation is generally
understood to be a short-term, structured, task-oriented, participatory
intervention process. Disputing parties work with a neutral third party, the
mediator, to negotiate towards a resolution of their conflict."); see also BLACKS
LAW DICTIONARY 841 (9th ed. 2004) ("A method of nonbinding dispute
resolution involving a neutral third party who tries to help the disputing parties
reach a mutually agreeable solution.").
59. See supra note 58 (providing that a mediator assists the parties to shape
their own agreement).
60. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 57, at 566 ("This research suggests that
negotiating effectiveness may be lost because of two effects of culture: the
inability of negotiating approaches to work as well across cultures and the fact
that the other negotiator may come from a negotiating culture not suited to the
creation of joint gains."); see also Ileana Dominguez-Urban, The Messenger as the
Medium of Communication: The Use of Interpretersin Mediation, 1997J. DISP. RESOL.
1, 49 (1997) (explaining that mediators are expected to be sensitive to cultural
differences between the parties).
61. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Staying in Orbit, or Breaking Free: The
Relationship of Mediation to the Courts over Four Decades, 84 N.D. L. REV. 705, 753
(2008) ("The distinguishing characteristic of mediation was supposed to be that
the parties themselves, rather than the third party, would hold the power to
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the decision or settlement agreement;6 2 and (3) the parties
develop a relationship through mediation, and it is out of respect
for this new relationship that parties are encouraged to comply
with the terms of their self-crafted settlement agreement.6 3
Traditional conceptions of mediation involve parties that
have voluntarily agreed to pursue mediation and are equal in
bargaining power. 64 Today in the United States, this traditional
approach to mediation is being challenged by court-mandated
mediation sessions, as parties with a bargaining-power disparity
may be improperly instructed to mediate their dispute. 65
Specifically in the context of family law cases in which domestic
violence is present, mediation is often not regarded as a suitable

make ultimate decisions affecting outcome. Even in emerging ethical standards
for the field, a key principle was preserving party self-determination . . . ."); see
also Nancy A. Welsh, The Place of Court-ConnectedMediation in a DemocraticJustice
System, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 117, 135-36 (2004) ("Mediation
proponents emphasized the central role to be played by citizens in disputes.
Citizens-not judges or attorneys or other professionals-would communicate
and negotiate directly with each other, identify the issues to be discussed,
determine the substantive norms that were legitimate and relevant (including
the pursuit of harmony and reconciliation if they wished), create the options for
settlement, and control the final decision regarding whether or not to settle and
on what terms. The mediator's role was to facilitate and to help these disputing
parties find their own voices and solutions.").
62. See supra note 61 (discussing that the parties to mediation set the terms
of their settlement agreement).
63. See Nancy A. Welsh, Court-OrderedADR: What Are the Limits?, 12 HAMLINE
J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 35, 49 (1991) (categorizing mediation as a non-binding
process); see also GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 57, at 108 (explaining mediation
as a transformative process that assists parties to empathize with one another and
develop a relationship in the aftermath of a dispute (quoting ROBERT A. BARUCH
BUSH &JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION 22, 95 (2005)).

64. See Andree G. Gagnon, Ending Mandatory Divorce Mediation for Battered
Women, 15 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 272, 274 (1992) ("The basic elements are
voluntary participation, equality or rough parity of bargaining power, neutrality
on the part of the mediator, and confidentiality."); see also Gabriel H.
Teninbaum, Easing the Burden: MediatingMisdemeanor Criminal Matters, 62 DISP.
RESOL. J. 63, 64 (2007) (explaining that mediation, as opposed to litigation,
offers parties an opportunity to participate in the resolution process, and is
intended for parties with equal bargaining power).
65. See James A. Beha II, Mediation in Commercial Cases Can Be Very Effective for
Clients, 74 N.Y. ST. B.J. 10, 10 (2002) (explaining that mediation is a voluntary
process, but it is not unusual for courts to order parties to civil litigation to
mediate their cases). See generally GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 57, at 402-28
(discussing the rising trend to impose mediation on parties to cases).
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dispute resolution process. 66 Practitioners who mediate disputes
between parties with a history of domestic violence have met, and
continue to meet, resistance from their colleagues.6 7 The power
imbalance that is inherent in a domestic violence relationship
has the potential to interfere with the victims' ability to address
their concerns while in a mediation session with the abuser.68 In
addition, mediation is characterized as an amicable dispute
resolution process; therefore the mediation climate may
discourage victims from expressing their repressed emotions,
muffling victims when they attempt to express feelings of anger.69
66. SeeJAY E. GRENIG, 1 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (3d ed.)

§

21:11

(2010) ("Mediation is generally inappropriate where one spouse has a history of
abusive behavior toward the other."); see also Sarah Krieger, Note, The Dangers of
Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 235, 242 (2002)
(explaining the risks and issues associated with mediation in the context of
domestic violence cases).
67. See generally Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for
Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991) (highlighting the disadvantages of mediation
for women generally, and battered women in divorce proceedings); Barbara J.
Hart, Gentle jeopardy: The Further Endangerment of Battered Women and Children in
Custody Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 317 (1990) (discussing the risk associated
with mediating domestic violence cases for both women and children); Kelly
Rowe, Comment, The Limits of the NeighborhoodJustice Center: Why Domestic Violence
Cases Should Not Be Mediated, 34 EMORY L.J. 855 (1985) (contending that
domestic violence cases are not appropriate for mediation).
68. See Rowe, supra note 67, at 864 ("The passivity and subordination of the
battered woman make it difficult for her to assert herself in a bargaining
situation, negotiate for her needs, and reject solutions which do not meet those
needs. She is apt to be more easily worn down, more suggestible, and less able to
be confrontive than the average disputant, whether in domestic or nondomestic
situations. Negotiation may also be more difficult for the victim due to her fear
of the batterer."); see also Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Representing a
Victim of Domestic Violence, FAM. ADVOC., Winter 1995, at 25, 26-27 (explaining
mediation as "incompatible with a relationship in which there is
disproportionate bargaining power due to fear or intimidation").
69. See Grillo, supra note 67, at 1572 ("Although mediation is claimed to be a
setting in which feelings can be expressed, certain sentiments are often simply not
welcome. In particular, expressions of anger are frequently overtly discouraged. This
discouragement of anger sends a message that anger is unacceptable, terrifying and
dangerous. For a person who has only recently found her anger, this can be a perilous
message indeed. This suppression of anger poses a stark contrast to the image of
mediation as a process which allows participants to express their emotions."); see also
Douglas D. Knowlton & Tara Lea Muhlhauser, Mediation in the Presence of Domestic
Violence: Is It the Light at the End of the Tunnel or Is a Train on the Track?, 70 N.D. L. REV.
255, 266 (1994) ("[T]he mediation process does not validate the victim's anger or
emotions. They argue that there is a need for such validation in order for there to be
some therapeutic gain for the victim. The critics assert that mediation may make the
victim feel guilty and selfish.").
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The controversy that surrounds the decision to mediate
disputes between parties with a history of domestic violence is
relevant to the question of whether mediation is appropriate to
resolve disputes between a state government and an indigenous
population. State governments often assume a position
analogous to that of a domestic violence abuser, as state
governments often mistreat indigenous persons and fail to
respect their rights. 7 0 As applied to the subjects of this Note, this
raises the parallel fear that, should the Israeli government
and Bedouin stakeholders mediate their land dispute, the
Bedouin stakeholders will have less bargaining power
during mediation and be further disadvantaged. Being the
subordinate party, Negev Bedouin stakeholders may
hesitate to fully address their true concerns during
mediation in fear of negative consequences. Similarly,
should Bedouin stakeholders disregard the consequences
of conversing candidly with the government, mediation
may muffle the voices of Bedouin stakeholders, as
mediators often discourage therapeutic, yet unproductive,
expressions of anger and resentment. Given the possible
disadvantages of mediation, Part II of this Note will
consider whether the power imbalance between the Negev
Bedouins and Israel stands as a barrier to employing
mediation to resolve the dispute for the Negev.
II. IN LIGHT OF THE POWER IMBALANCE BETWEEN
THE PARTIES, IS MEDIATION A RESPONSIBLE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROCESS?
While practitioners historically opposed mediation for
parties with a history of a power imbalance, mediation
disputes between such parties is growing to be an
acceptable practice so long as the mediator employs prescreening mediation and safe mediation techniques to
protect the subordinate party. This growing acceptance,
applied to the context of indigenous-state disputes for land,
suggests that indigenous and government parties with a

70. See supra note 53 (explaining that state parties exert control over and
are more powerful than indigenous parties in disputes for land).
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power imbalance need not avoid mediation to settle their
disputes.
Section A of Part II discusses the relationship between
the Israeli government and the Negev Bedouins and reveals
the parties to have a power imbalance. Section B primarily
discusses the institutional support to mediate the Israeli
government-Bedouin land dispute. Section C discusses the
state and transnational institutions that support mediation
in the context of state-indigenous disputes.
A.

The Power Imbalance between the Israeli Government and the
Negev Bedouins

The history of the Negev Bedouins and their
relationship with the Israeli government shed light on the
question of whether the Israeli government and the
Bedouins have a power imbalance, and ultimately, whether
the parties should pursue mediation to resolve their land
dispute.
The Negev Bedouins are indigenous persons7 1 and
identify as an ethnic minority population within the
Palestinian minority in Israel.7 2 The Bedouins reside on and
cultivate Negev Desert land and have created villages that
Israel recognizes as not being owned by the Bedouins but
by the state.7 3 Nevertheless, Bedouins continue to claim

71. See supranote 22 (explaining that the UN uses the characteristics of selfidentification, historical continuity, non-dominance, ancestral territories, and
ethnic identity to define "indigenous").
72. See Yehuda Gruenberg, Note, Not All Who Wander Should Be Lost: The
Rights of Indigenous Bedouins in the Modern State oflsrae4 34 BROOK.J. INT'L L. 185,
189 (2008) (documenting that the Bedouin population is a minority population
within the Arab minority population in Israel); see also Yosef Ben-David, The
Bedouin In Israel, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/
jsource/Society_&_Culture/Bedouin.html (last visted Mar. 13, 2011) (noting that the
Bedouin population is a minority within the Arab minority in Israel).
73. see CONSENSUS BUILDING INST., CONFLIcr ASSESSMENT REPORT:
DEVELOPMENT DISPUTES IN KSEIFE AND UM BATIN 5 (2006) (on file with author)
[hereinafter CBI REPORT] ("[The Bedouins] date their ownership claims back
to before the establishment of the state of Israel); see also Oren Yiftachel, Bedouin
Arabs and the Israeli Settler State: Land Policies and Indigenous Resistance, in THE
FUTURE OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL AND DEVELOPMENT

21-47 (Duane Champagne & Ismael Abu-Saad eds., 2003) (discussing the
struggle for land between the state of Israel and the indigenous Bedouin Arab
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ownership to this land, and the Bedouins have an interest
in gaining state-recognized legal rights to the land on
which their ancestors have resided and cultivated. Bedouins
have brought their land claims to the Israeli judicial system,
and all have been denied redress for lack of sufficient
documentation in accordance with Israeli land law. 4
The Israeli government and the Negev Bedouins have
a turbulent relationship that is characterized by mistrust,7 5
which has increased as a result of a policy response to the
Bedouin land dispute, known as the "Sharon five-year
plan."7 6 The Israeli government arguably developed this
population in the south of Israel and explaining that, for centuries, this area was
the main grazing and habitation ground for the Bedouin Arabs).
74. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,

OFF THE MAP: LAND AND

HOUSING RIGHTS

VIOLATIONS IN ISRAEL'S UNRECOGNIZED BEDOUIN VILLAGES 25 (2008), available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/03/30/map ("Despite attempts over the years,
including appeals to the Israeli High Court ofJustice, no Bedouin has ever succeeded in
registering land in his/her own name, for lack of a tabu ownership deed that is needed
to prove ownership under Israeli law. Many Bedouin have other documentation proving
long-term possession and use of the land-some, for example, showed Human Rights
Watch tax receipts paid to Ottoman and British authorities, tribal land court documents,
or sales contracts with other Bedouin bearing official Ottoman or British stamps. The
failure of the courts and litigation to redress the land rights of the Bedouin has led some
to suggest that a different approach is needed."); see also SHLOMO SWIRSKI & YAEL
HASSON, ADVA CENTER, INVISIBLE CITIZENS: ISRAELI GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD

THE NEGEV BEDOUIN 4 (2006), available at http://www.adva.org/uploaded/
NegevEnglishSummary.pdf ("As early as 1950, Bedouin took their land claims to court.
For its part, the state contended that the Bedouin had no proof of ownership; moreover,
it contended that the certificates of tax payment cited as proof of ownership had gotten
lost in the state archives.").
75. See CBI REPORT, supra note 73, at vii ("Across the Negev ... relationships
between Bedouin communities and the State are extremely poor, characterized
by a substantial mutual mistrust, and fueled by perceptions of discrimination on
the one hand, and defiance of the laws of the State on the other."); see also Talia
Berman-Kishony, Bedouin Urbanization Legal Policies in Israel and Jordan: Similar
Goals, Contrasting Strategies, 17 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 393, 393
(2008) ("Disputes between the indigenous Bedouins in Israel's Negev Desert
and the Israeli government are rooted in a clash between traditional nomadic
lifestyle and the moves of modern society. These conflicts involve complex
intertwined legal issues of property, land, identity, culture, and equity.").
76. See Jonathan Cook, Bedouin in the Negev Face New "Transfer," MIDDLE
EAST REPORT ONLINE, (May 10, 2003), http://www.merip.org/mero/mero051003
(explaining that the Bedouin population considered Sharon's five-year plan as
"'a declaration of war on the Bedouin community of the unrecognized villages'"
as the "'plan was never discussed with any of the population or their
representatives"' (quoting the Regional Council for the Unrecognized Villages,
the primary Bedouin lobbying group)); see also SWIRSKI & HASSON, supranote 74,
at 9 ("The Regional Council of Unrecognized Villages in the Negev perceived
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plan to encourage the Bedouins to move from their selfcreated villages to government-planned and recognized
villages,7 7 freeing up the Negev for new real estate
developments.7 8 The Bedouins perceived the Israeli
government to have created this plan unilaterally and
without adequately consulting representatives of the
Bedouin community.79 The Sharon Plan created a number
of incentives to encourage Bedouins to comply with the
plan's terms.8 0 The incentives originally included provisions
that aimed to subsidize land, create compensation packages
for the loss of land outside the government-recognized
villages, involve the Bedouin population in the planning of
new settlements, create employment opportunities in
the Sharon plan as a 'declaration of war' on residents of unrecognized villages,
primarily because of its emphasis on law enforcement.").
77. See David Kovick et al., Resolving Conflicts between the Israeli Government
and Bedouin Stakeholders in Kseife and Um Batin, CONSENSUS BUILDING INST.,
(2006),
http://cbuilding.org/publication/case/resolving-conflicts-between-israeli(explaining that half of the
government-and-bedouin-stakeholders-kseife-andBedouin population resides in seven government-planned towns, and the
remainder live on traditional Bedouin land and therefore receive almost no
public services); see also SWIRSKI & HASSON, supranote 74, at 7 ("Israel's desire to
strengthen its position in the Negev, primarily by setting up Jewish
settlements ... underpinned the Israeli government's decision to transfer the
few Bedouin remaining in the Negev area from the northwestern part of the
Negev to the confines of a smaller area in its northeastern part.").
78. See Cook, supra note 76 (suggesting that former Israel Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon had an interest to offer Negev land to Jewish immigrants and to
develop ranch estates, similar to his own, in the Negev Desert); see also SWIRSKI &
HASSON, supra note 74, at 7.
79. See Berman-Kishony, supra note 75, at 402 ("[T]his process was
undertaken, as perceived by Bedouins, without adequately consulting
representatives of the Bedouin community."); Cook, supra note 76 (explaining
that the Bedouins perceived the plan to be a declaration of war, as they were not
part of the planning process).
80. See Havatzelet Yahel, Land Disputes between the Negev Bedouin and Israel,2
ISRAEL STUD. 1, 13 (2006) ("According to this government plan, more then [sic]
NIS [Israeli New Shekel] 1 billion are to be invested in the expansion and
improvement of the Bedouin towns, as well as in the land title settlement
process, law enforcement, and other important issues relating to the Bedouin. A
special budget of hundreds of millions of shekels was allocated to compensate
Bedouin moving into towns."); see also Berman-Kishony, supra note 75, at 402
("The five-year plan also set aside a considerable budget to support numerous
incentives: subsidized land, compensation packages for the loss of land outside
the recognized villages, a stated intention to involve the Bedouin population in
the planning of these settlements, the creation of sources of employment in
Bedouin communities, and educational activities.").
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Bedouin communities, and offer educational activities. 8 '
The plan also introduced a number of penalties for those
Bedouins who chose not to accept and comply with the
plan.8 2 These penalties have made living in the
unrecognized villages extremely uncomfortable and have
materialized in the form of home demolitions and crop
destruction.8 3 The Israeli government continues to impose
these penalties.8 4 In July 2010, it was reported that the
81. See supra note 80 (describing the incentives of the Sharon five-year plan).
82. See Berman-Kishony, supra note 75, at 402-03 (" [T]he plan introduced
several legal penalties aimed at making the lives of Bedouins in the remaining
unrecognized villages extremely uncomfortable in an effort to convince them to
move to the planned towns. These penalties are being applied in the courts,
villages, and fields. The government decided to protect its perceived land rights
by filing counter-claims against Bedouin disputants. This litigation means a loss
of Bedouin control over lands they perceive as their own due to the lack of
registration of Bedouin-claimed land in the official land registry. Systematic
demolition of houses outside the planned towns, as well as crop destruction, is
taking place in the unrecognized villages."); see also Cook, supra note 76 ("The
crop spraying and new wave of demolitions indicate that Sharon is likely to show
little mercy in his battle to clear the Negev.").
83. See NEGEV COEXISTENCE FORUM FOR CIVIL EQUALITY, THE ARABBEDOUINS OF THE NAQAB-NEGEV DESERT IN ISRAEL 30-32 (2006), available at
http://dukium.org/modules/coppermine/albums/userpics/pdf files/CERD
ENGweb.pdf (discussing the state attempts to drive out the Bedouins through
early morning raids, home demolition, and crop destruction); see also Press
Release, Arab Ass'n for Human Rights, Israel's Poisonous Aerial Spraying ofNegev
Crops Illegal, Endangers Health of Bedouin Villagers (uly 6, 2004), available at
http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article2871.shtml ("On seven occasions, over a
period of two years, the Israeli government has sent planes to the Negev to spray
the crops of Bedouin farmers with toxic chemicals. Some 7,500 acres of Bedouin
fields have been destroyed since February 2002. The last such incident occurred
as recently as March 2004 at Qtamat and Abeida villages, ruining some 750 acres
of crops shortly before the harvest."); Nir Hasson, An Entire Village in the Balance,
HAARETZ (Tel Aviv), Dec. 20, 2004, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=516503 ("[B]uilding inspectors from the Ministry of the
Interior came to ... an unrecognized Bedouin village ... circulated among the
70 tin shacks in the village and pasted court demolition orders on each of them
bearing the heading: 'The State of Israel versus Unknown.'"); Am Johal, The
Bedouin Dilemma, WORLDPRESS.ORG, (Nov. 17, 2004), http://www.worldpress.
org/printarticle.cfm?article id=2098&dont=yes ("Over 150 homes have been
demolished and 30,000 dunams of crops have been sprayed and destroyed in the
Negev since 2002. Many consider the spraying to be a form of pressure on the
Bedouin to move from their current locations.").
84. See Berman-Kishony, supranote 75, at 403 (explaining how the Bedouins
are continuously penalized and not invited to participate in government
planning efforts); see also Israel Police Raze "Illegal"Bedouin Village in Negev, BBC NEWS,
(July 27, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10777040 ("Around 300
Bedouins living in Israel's Negev desert have been made homeless after police raided
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Israeli government was responsible for the razing of a
Negev village, Al-Arakib, which was home to over 300
Bedouins.8 5 The conditions in which Negev Bedouins live
and the treatment they receive from the Israeli government
likely perpetuate the mistrust the Bedouins have for the
state.
Additionally, the Negev Bedouins are Israeli citizens
but do not receive rights that are available to other Israeli
citizens: Bedouins are not permitted to construct
permanent housing, their villages do not appear on Isreali
maps, they cannot vote, and they do not receive basic
services such as running water, electricity, garbage
collection, roads, schools, and health clinics.8 6 These
services would be available to the Bedouins if they
complied with the government and relocated from their
ancestral home. It follows that the Israeli government has
effectively alienated the Bedouins who reside on their
ancestral lands and continues to deny the Negev Bedouins
of their indigenous rights.
Bedouins who have been persuaded to relocate to
government-created towns from their ancestral land also struggle
with poor living conditions, as they experience high
unemployment rates and fall into the lowest income bracket in
Israel.8 7 The government-created Bedouin communities
have poor educational facilities,88 which will likely make it
their village and razed their homes."); Neve Gordon, Ethnic Cleansing in the IsraeliNegev,
GUARDIAN (London), July 28, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/
jul/28/ethnic-cleansing-israeli-negev?intcmp=239 (explaining that the recently razed
village was home to 300 Bedouins).
85. See Israel Police Raze "Illegal" Bedouin Village in Negev, supra note 84; Gordon,
supranote 84.
86. See NEGEV COEXISTENCE FORUM FOR CIVIL EQUALITY, supra note 83, at
33 (noting that the Bedouins who refuse to relocate from their ancestral lands
are denied basic services and infrastructure, including access to paved roads,
water, garbage collection, and electricity); see also SWIRSKI & HASSON, supra note
74, at 2 (explaining that Bedouins in the unrecognized villages do not have
access to the public services to which citizens of Israel are entitled).
87. See NEGEV COEXISTENCE FORUM FOR CIVIL EQUALITY, supra note 83, at 8
("Consequently, the forced urbanization of this population has been disastrous:
unemployment is high, and the Arab-Bedouin towns rank among the country's
10 poorest municipalities.").
88. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SECOND CLASS,
PALESTINIAN ARAB CHILDREN IN ISRAEL'S SCHOOLS

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
21
(2001),
available at

http://vvw.hrw.org/en/reports/2001/09/30/second-class-0

("Compared with Jewish
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difficult for future Bedouin generations to lift themselves
from these disparate conditions.
It is conceivable that the daily hardships with which the
Negev Bedouins live serve as a frequent reminder of the
damaged relationship the Bedouins have with their
government. In addition, the region's on-going IsraeliPalestinian conflict8 9 exacerbates the power imbalance, as
the Bedouin population is an Arab minority within the
Arab population in Israel.90 By and large, the relationship
between the Negev Bedouins and the Israeli government is
marked with a power imbalance, and the parties are at a
deadlock in their dispute for the Negev Desert.9 1
B.

Is ProposingMediation at Odds with the Mediation Custom
that DiscouragesMediation between Partieswith a Power
Imbalance?

Having outlined the relationship between the Israeli
government and the Negev Bedouins, this Section returns
to the discussion of mediation to determine whether it is an
appropriate dispute resolution mechanism for the parties,
given their power imbalance. As previously discussed, the
use of mediation between parties with a power imbalance
raises concerns and is considered controversial among
some practitioners. Though some advocates who work on
domestic violence legal cases argue that traditional
students, Palestinian Arab students are more likely to drop out of school, less likely to
pass the matriculation examination (bagrul), and less likely to qualify for university
admission if they do pass. Among Palestinian Arabs, these differences are much greater
for Negev Bedouin."); Gruenberg, supra note 72, at 188-89 (" [A]s Israel developed into
a modem industrialized nation, the institutional discrimination against Israeli Arabs,
and in particular Bedouins, continued virtually unabated in areas ranging from
education, health care, water, and land rights to herding and grazing rights.").
89. See generally History of the Question of Palestine, UN INFORMATION SYSTEM
ON

THE

QUESTION

OF

PALESTINE,

http://www.un.org/depts/dpa/qpal/ngo/

history.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2011) (outlining the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict).
90. See Gruenberg, supra note 72, at 189 (explaining that the Bedouin
population is a minority within the Arab minority in Israel).
91. See Berman-Kishony, supra note 75, at 403 ("[T]he penalties stimulated
increasing mistrust of the Israeli government, Bedouin resistance, and
radicalization, including a rapid growth of the Islamic movement. The Bedouins
and the Israeli government are now at a deadlock."); see also CBI REPORT, supra
note 73, at v (explaining that the Israeli government and Bedouin parties have
reached an impasse).
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mediation is not appropriate for parties with a power
imbalance,9 2 practitioners sometime support mediation for
parties with a history of domestic violence, so long as
mediators screen parties in advance of the mediation and
employ safe mediation techniques to counteract and
monitor the power imbalance.9 3
During pre-mediation screening in domestic violence cases,
the mediator and the victim would privately discuss the victim's
participation in the mediation process and what the victim feels
the consequences would be should the victim fail to consent to
mediation.9 4 The screener would also examine the mindset of the
victim and ask questions that would better enable the mediator to
oversee a mediation process that would empower the victim and
minimize the effects of the power imbalance. 95 By candidly
discussing the victim's fears and apprehensions during pre-

92. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (explaining that mediation
should be discouraged between parties with a history of domestic violence to
protect the victim).
93. See generally Jane C. Murphy & Robert Rubinson, Domestic Violence and
Mediation: Responding to the Challenges of CraftingEffective Screens, 39 FAM. L.Q. 53,
70 (2005) (discussing how proper screens and protocols will help victims of
domestic violence reap the benefits of mediation and avoid the pitfalls that a
party power imbalance may create); Rend L. Rimelspach, Mediating Family
Disputes in a World with Domestic Violence: How to Devise a Safe and Court-Connected
Mediation Program, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 95, 110-11 (2001) ("There
does not seem to be a clear case to reject mediation for family disputes, despite
the prevalence of domestic violence.... However, this is not to say that courtconnected mediation programs can be unmindful of the special difficulties that
the prevalence of domestic violence in our society presents.... With proper
planning, thorough training, and special safeguards, court-connected mediation
programs can provide high quality, safe service to their constituents.");
Alexandria Zylstra, Mediation and Domestic Violence: A PracticalScreening Methodfor
Mediators and Mediation Program Administrators, 2001 J. DiSP. RESOL. 253 (2001)
(discussing how practitioners should be trained to assess when a power
imbalance has affected the weaker party's ability to express his or her views and
negotiate freely, so that the mediation process does not further harm the weaker
party).
94. See Laurie S. Kohn, What's so Funny about Peace, Love, and Understanding?
Restorativejustice as a New Paradigmfor Domestic Violence Intervention, 40 SETON HALL L.
REv. 517, 582 (2010) ("In this meeting, the screener would also need to examine the
victim's reasons for seeking a restorative justice intervention and what she feels might
happen to her if she fails to consent. Though the frequent power imbalance between the
parties could render any bargaining that might take place in the conference insincere, a
screener could try to determine if such an imbalance exists in this relationship and if the
victim could be supported in a way to reduce the effects of the imbalance.").
95. See id.

2011] MEDIATION TO RESOLVE NEGEVDESERT DISPUTE 1117
mediation screening, the mediator becomes better
equipped to take measures that will protect and empower
the victim. Ultimately, becoming familiar with the victim's
mindset during pre-mediation screening enables the
mediator to maintain a safe mediation environment and
detect when a weaker party is unable to freely express its
opinions and the mediation process is no longer
productive.96

The mediator's focus would be different when screening the
abuser in preparation for mediation.9 7 Instead of focusing on
ways in which the mediation may empower the abuser, the
screener would discuss matters of responsibility and encourage
the abuser to admit responsibility for certain abusive actions and
to make these admissions throughout the course of mediation.9 8
Such admissions may assist the parties to find a power
equilibrium, disarming the abuser and empowering the victim.
Pre-mediation screening results may lead the mediator
to ask that the attorney for the weaker party be present
throughout all mediation sessions; the attorney can
enhance the weaker party's power by speaking on its behalf
and evaluate proposed concessions and solutions with the
weaker party.9 9 It follows that mediation may be structured
and monitored to ensure that the weaker party to the
mediation will not lose bargaining power during the
mediation process. The evolution of screening, and the
actions that mediators may take as a result of screening,
96. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (describing the techniques
mediators may use to protect the victim of a domestic violence relationship
during mediation sessions).
97. See Kohn, supra note 94, at 582 ("Although the screening meeting with the
victim would focus on issues of coercion and voluntary consent, the meeting with the
offender might focus more so on his admission of responsibility.").
98. See id.
99. See Murphy & Rubinson, supra note 93, at 66 (" [L]awyers can have a crucial
role to play in preparing for and attending the mediation sessions themselves. In so
doing, lawyers act as power enhancers and equalizers: they can speak on behalf of
clients, evaluate proposed solutions in light of applicable legal norms and the specific
experiences of the client, and, if necessary, suggest opting out of the mediation itself if it
is not serving the interests of clients."). See generally Craig McEwan et al., Bring in the
Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79
MINN. L. REv. 1317 (1995) (describing how lawyers may advocate on behalf of their
clients during mediation to ensure a fair mediation process in a non-threatening
environment).
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suggests that parties with a power imbalance need not
reject mediation as a viable dispute resolution process.
Given the promise of screening techniques and the
ways in which mediators may counteract the power
imbalance between parties, the subjects of this Note need
not rule out the possibility of using mediation to resolve
their dispute for the Negev Desert. Though the Israeli
government and Negev Bedouins do not hold equal
amounts of power and Bedouins have been made victim to
abusive state acts, screening will allow mediators to craft a
safe mediation program-one that will restore bargaining
power to the Negev Bedouin party. Mediators will be tasked
with monitoring the mediation closely to ensure that safe
techniques effectively enable the Bedouin party to speak
freely and minimize the threats involved with negotiating
with a party with more power. Through proper screening
and planning, mediators may create a safe mediation
environment for the Negev Bedouin party.
C. InstitutionalSupportfor Mediation to Resolve the Israeli
Government-Negev Bedouin Dispute and State-Indigenous
Disputes Generally
Having addressed pre-mediation screening and the
ways in which mediators may assist parties with a power
this Section
mediation,
safely use
to
imbalance
demonstrates that there is support for mediation in the
context of resolving state government-indigenous disputes
and, specifically, the Israeli government-Negev Bedouin
land dispute. This Section discusses the support given to
state government-indigenous mediation by groups within
the public interest sector, domestic-state court systems,
domestic-legislative bodies, and international judicial
systems.
1. In the Public Interest Sector, the Consensus Building
Institute Advocates for Mediation to Resolve the Israeli
Government-Negev Bedouin Dispute
Despite the mediation custom that discourages mediation
for parties with a power imbalance-and despite the presence of
a party power imbalance between the Israeli government and the
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Negev Bedouins-a well-known international alternative dispute
resolution group has proposed that the Israeli government and
Bedouin representatives explore non-adversarial options to
resolve their dispute for land. 0 0 The Consensus Building
Institute, a not-for-profit organization that resolves disputes
world-wide through alternative dispute resolution practices,1 0 1
has developed a mediation plan for the Israeli government and
Bedouin stakeholders1 0 2 and has explored whether mediation
would be fruitful in this context. 0 3 The CBI has devoted many
years to a process it refers to as "trust building," in an effort to
make the climate ripe for mediation in the Negev. 104 In 2007, CBI
drafted its findings in a report and presented this report to the
Israeli government and Negev Bedouin stakeholders.1 05 Though

100. See generally CBI REPORT, supra note 73 (documenting the CBI's
research and fieldwork in the Negev to encourage the parties to mediate their
dispute for the Negev Desert).
101. See Mission and Hisotry, CONSENSUS BUILDING INST., http://cbuilding.org/
mission (last visited Mar. 12, 2011) ("The Consensus Building Institute (CBI) is a notfor-profit organization created by leading practitioners and theory builders in the fields
of negotiation and dispute resolution. CBI works with leaders, advocates, experts, and
communities to promote effective negotiations, build consensus, and resolve conflicts.").
102. See Kovick et al., supra note 77 ("For the past several years, CBI has
engaged in an effort to explore whether mediation might provide a more
effective way of resolving disputes over land and development in the Negev. In
January 2005, after many years of trust-building with all parties, CBI received a
mandate to conduct a comprehensive Conflict Assessment Process-a systematic
mapping of the conflict, leading to recommendations for design[ing] an
effective negotiation process mediated by neutrals.").
103. See id. ("To conduct the assessment, CBI assembled a multi-cultural
team ofJewish and Arab-Israeli mediators and planning professionals, supported
by American colleagues. The team conducted over 250 confidential interviews
with Bedouin and government stakeholders, leading to a new understanding of
the conflict. The Assessment outlines the parties that need to be part of any
negotiated resolution, the issues that need to be addressed, the interests of the
different parties, and the concerns and obstacles to such a process. It also offers
recommendations on how such a conversation ought to be structured in order
to achieve sustainable, lasting resolution."); see also Berman-Kishony, supra note
75, at 410 ("CBI prepared a conflict assessment report. The report summarizes
the different views of the stakeholders, provides an analysis of the opportunities
and obstacles to resolving disputes, and offers recommendations regarding the
kind of dialogue process that might lead to a resolution of differences. In the
report, CBI has suggested moving ahead with a formal mediation process. . .
104. See Kovick et al., supranote 77.
105. See id. ("The CBI team formally presented its report to Government
and Bedouin stakeholders in January 2007."); see also CBI REPORT, supranote 73.
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the stakeholders responded favorably to the report,1 0 6 the Israeli
government has not yet agreed to begin the mediation process.
As is more fully discussed below, the CBI is joined by a number of
other institutions that also advocate for mediation to resolve state
government and indigenous disputes.
2.

Large Transnational Organizations Support Mediation
for State-Indigenous Disputes

In the past, large transnational organizations have used
mediation to resolve land disputes between state governments
and indigenous persons. The Inter-American system calls on
alternative dispute resolution processes to resolve abuses of
human rights in order to enable the nonstate actor to participate
in the resolution process and to decide what sort of relationship
it will have with the state in the aftermath of the conflict. 0 7 The
Inter-American system has sought to provide recourse for
indigenous persons to help them assert their right to land and
has shown great interest in mediating disputes between
indigenous parties and member states throughout this process.10 8
Additionally, the United Nations recognizes mediation as a
viable process with which to resolve disputes; its Charter
recommends that member states use mediation when peace and

106. See id. (noting that Israel and Bedouin stakeholders responded
positively to the CBI report).
107. See Patricia E. Standaert, The Friendly Settlement of Human Rights Abuses
in the Americas, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 519, 536 (1999) ("The InterAmerican Commission's friendly settlement mechanism gives the individual the
opportunity to attain a broader sense of healing than that achieved by monetary
compensation. The mediation model provides the victim a chance to be heard
and actually to control the outcome of its relationship with the state."); see also
Mike Perry, Beyond Dispute: A Comment on ADR and Human-Rights Adjudication,
Disp. RESOL. J., May 1998, at 50, 53 ("Mediation allows the parties to explain
their perspectives on the dispute and focuses on reaching a settlement that
addresses the interests of each party. Mediation provides privacy to the parties
and, when voluntary, permits the complainant a great measure of control over
the process.").
108. See Graham, supra note 48, at 410 (" [T]he Inter-American system has
been utilized by indigenous peoples of the Americas to assert their rights to
cultural integrity, land and resources, non-discrimination, and greater political
autonomy-all key norms associated with the right of self-determination.... In
addition, the Commission has shown a strong interest in mediating disputes
between indigenous peoples and member states.").
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security are threatened. 0 9 Therefore, member states of the UN,
bound by the UN Charter, recognize mediation as an alternative
to the adversarial system." 0 The UN likely advocates for ADR
processes because it has recognized that mediation is more likely
to foster dialogue that is rooted in fundamental human rights
rather than restrictive domestic legal principles."' A dialogue
governed by human rights law rather than domestic law is more
likely to benefit an indigenous group, as the position of a state
government is often supported by its own state law and domestic
legal principles." 2 Therefore, it is not surprising that
international systems, like the Inter-American system and the
United Nations, support mediation to resolve disputes of this
nature.

109. See U.N. Charter, supra note 23, art. 33 ("The parties to any dispute,
the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."); see
also Ian Brownlie, The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, 8 CHINESE J.
INT'L L. 267, 272 (2009) (explaining how the United Nations has often either
recommended or conducted mediation between disputing parties).
110. See U.N. Charter, supra note 23, art. 2 (stating that all member states
are bound to the provisions of the Charter).
111. See William Jonas, 2000 Native Title Report Summary, AUSTRALIAN
HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N (2000), http://www.hreoc.gov.au/social justice/nt~report/
ntreport00/nt2000_report.html (supporting the notion that court decisions are not
likely to acknowledge nonlegal principles such as the importance of ancestral
land to the Bedouin lifestyle); see also Carlos Scott Lopez, Reformulating Native
Title in Mabo's Wake: Aboriginal Sovereignty and Reconciliation in Post-Centenary
Australia, 11 TULsAJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 21, 52-53 (2003) ("The ultimate question
of which takes precedence renders the entire system lifeless, since any legislation
must deny Native Peoples of their rights due to the fact that the legislation
cannot theoretically meet the needs of external constituencies.").
112. See Paul Chartrand, Foreword to INTERCULTURAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
IN ABORIGINAL CONTEXTS ix (Catherine Bell & David Kahane eds., 2004) ("In
the eyes of some critics, the courts are the government gizzard, which grinds up
Aboriginal interests. Even the courts themselves have recently been at pains to
emphasize that negotiation is better than adjudication to resolve disputes."); see
also Osi, supra note 22, at 219 (" [F]oreign-imposed court systems provided some
relief in the past, but they also frequently disappointed Indigenous or Aboriginal
peoples.").
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3.

State Legislative Bodies Use Mediation to Resolve StateIndigenous Disputes

State legislatures also contribute to the international support
for mediation in this context. State legislatures have passed laws
in support of indigenous land rights and have required state
actors and indigenous parties to comply with state-mandated
conflict-resolution processes to protect these rights. For example,
in the United States, the Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act of
1996 emerged from a court's decision to order the US
government and indigenous tribes to mediate a settlement rather
than decide the indigenous land dispute case before it.113 The
Nicaraguan General Assembly passed Law 445, which requires
the state to demarcate indigenous land and utilize dispute
resolution processes to assist with the demarcation process.114
Similarly, Australia's Native Title Amendment Act of 1993 tries to
validate past state action by recognizing and protecting native
title.' 15 The Native Title Amendment Act protects indigenous
rights to land and relies on alternative dispute resolution
processes to settle the issue of compensation for the destruction
of native land and interests.116 In Papua New Guinea, the Land
113. Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute Settlement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-301,
110 Stat. 3649 (1996); see Erin Ruble & Gerald Torres, "PerfectGood Faith,"5 NEV.
L.J. 93, 110 (2004) ("On appeal the Ninth Circuit, instead of deciding the case,
ordered the tribes and the United States to enter into mediation. Out of this
mediation emerged the Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act of 1996."); see also
Eric Cheyfitz, Theory and Practice: The Case ofthe Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute, 10 AM.
U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 619, 629 (2002) ("In 1991, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, in lieu of hearing an appeal of the Manybeads case, ordered all the
groups involved into mediation in an attempt to resolve the dispute. The result
of this mediation was the Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act of 1996. . . .").
114. Ley No. 445, 13 Dec. 2002, Ley del Regimen de Propiedad Comunal de los
Pueblos Indigenas y Comunidades Etnicas de las Regiones Aut6nomas de la Costa
AtlIntica de Nicaragua y de los Rfos Bocay, Coco, Indio y Maiz [Law of the Communal
Property Regime of Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Communities of the Autonomous
Regions of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua and of the Bocay, Coco, Indio, and Maiz
Rivers], La Gaceta, Diario Oficial [L.G.], 23 Jan. 2003 (Nicar.); see Alvarado, supra
note 33, at 623-24 (noting that "in response to the Awas Tingni decision, the
Nicaraguan General Assembly enacted a land demarcation law, Law 445, which
ordered the adoption of a specific legislative or administrative mechanism for
demarcation of indigenous lands in Nicaragua" and discussing how a conflict
resolution process was part of the guidelines under Law 445).
115. See Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) ss 31, 33 (Austl.) (providing that
negotiations occur between the government and claimants, and stipulating
issues to be negotiated).
116. See id.
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Disputes Settlement Act created a mediation system to resolve
indigenous land disputes and requires claimants to bring their
suits before a panel of mediators.' 1 7 These examples highlight
some of the legislative bodies that have called on mediation to
process and resolve indigenous claims for land.
3. Transnational and StateJudicial Systems Encourage State
and Indigenous Parties to Pursue Mediation to Resolve Their
Disputes
In addition to large transnational organizations' and
legislative bodies' efforts to employ mediation to resolve disputes
between state and indigenous parties, judicial systems contribute
to this support for state-indigenous mediation. Judicial systems
worldwide employ collaborative methods, like mediation, to
resolve state and indigenous disputes to solicit indigenous
participation and repair relations between state governments and
indigenous parties.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in the
context of state-indigenous disputes, has ordered state
parties to demarcate and title indigenous land and to work
with the indigenous community during these processes.1 18
This call for more inclusive and problem-solving processes,
in the context of state-indigenous disputes, demonstrates
the judicial system's appreciation for non-adversarial
processes, like mediation, over more adversarial processes.
The High Court of Australia supported the principle that
indigenous persons should have the right to claim land and
participate in the land demarcation process in Mabo v.
9
Queensland, a landmark case that recognized native title."' The
117. See Land Dispute Settlements Act 1975 pt. III (Papua New Guinea); see also
Robert Cooter, Inventing Market Property: The Land Courts of Papua New Guinea,
25 LAw & SOC'Y REv. 759, 781 (1991) ("[The Land Disputes Settlement Act]
provides for the creation of a system of mediators and courts to resolve disputes
involving land under customary ownership.").
118. See Awas Tingni, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, 1[ 164, 173-74 (Aug. 31, 2001) (ordering Nicaragua to
demarcate and title Awas Tingni land "with full participation by the
[c]ommunity ... taking into account its customary law, values, customs and
mores.").
119. Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 58 (Austl.); see Gary D.
Meyers & Sally Raine, Australian AboriginalLand Rights in Transition (PartII): The
Legislative Response to the High Court's Native Title Decision in Mabo v. Queensland

1124 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 34:1089

court addressed the internationally recognized right of
indigenous persons to actively participate in alternative dispute
resolution processes to resolve land disputes and supported the
notion that indigenous persons have a legal right to the land on
which they reside.120
The Supreme Court of Canada advocates for mediation in
this context as well. In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, the court
offered that "it is through negotiated settlements, with good faith
and give and take on all sides that we will achieve . . . 'the
reconciliation of ... aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of

the Crown."" 2 ' Delgamuukw stands for the principle that problem
solving is key to reconciling state and indigenous disputes for
land. 2 2 The Canadian court likely recognized that alternative
dispute resolution processes are more conducive to resolving
complex disputes and preventing future conflict.123 It follows that
the Supreme Court of Canada would encourage state and
indigenous parties to resolve future disputes that may develop.

and Wik V. Queensland, 9 TULSAJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 95, 141 (2001) ("In the
leading judgement in Mabo,Justice Brennan (with Justices Toohey and McHugh
in agreement) notes that native title has its origins in and is given its content by
the traditional laws acknowledged by and traditional customs observed by the
indigenous inhabitants of a territory. Arguably, in accordance with this
principle, the right to negotiate is an incident of common law native title. The
right to negotiate acknowledges that indigenous peoples have an attachment to
land which includes not only economic but also cultural and spiritual
attachments."). See generally Gerard Brennan, Chief Justice of Austl., Seventh
Int'l Appellate Judges Conference: Aboriginal Land Claims-An Australian
Perspective (Sept. 25-29, 1995), available at http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/
(explaining
publications/speeches/former-justices/brennanj/brennanj-canada.htm
that, in accord with the Mabo decision, the Australian parliament adopted
legislation that provided ways in which native land rights should be addressed
and advocated for mediation and negotiation processes).
120. See supra note 119 (noting the High Court's support for indigenous
land rights and indigenous participation in titling and demarcation processes).
186 (Can. B.C.)
121. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010,
(quoting R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, 31 (Can.)).
122. See id.
123. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 57, at 518 ("The courts, for their part,
are primarily concerned with determining past facts rather than shaping future
possibilities. This favors the innocent, not the less powerful. Moreover, the
courts are singularly unconcerned about future relationships. The distributional
cases that wind up in court are handled pretty much like criminal caseswinners and losers are identified-because that is what the courts are equipped
to do." (quoting L. SUSSKIND &J. CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE (1987))).
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The judicial systems discussed above emphasize the value of
ADR and mediation for state-indigenous land disputes. The
degree of support for mediation in this type of dispute is not
surprising, as the process fosters healthy relations between parties
and may create viable solutions in this context.124 Mediation is
also beneficial to indigenous parties because it allows mediators
to consider oral testimony in place of tangible land deeds and
documents and therefore better understand the position of the
indigenous party and challenges it faces.' 2 5 In such land disputes,
courts often restrict the information that indigenous parties may
submit and must also apply stringent evidentiary burdens on
indigenous testimony.126 In addition, court processes are
generally more costly than mediation, burdening the poorer
indigenous party.'2 7 In light of such advantages, it is clear why the
international community recognizes alternatives, such as
mediation, as superior to courtroom litigation for resolving stateindigenous disputes.
III. THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND THE NEGEV
BEDO UINS SHOULD PURSUE MEDIATION TO RESOLVE
THEIR DISPUTE FOR THE NEGEEV DESERT
Given the advantages of mediation, the ways in which
mediators may employ screening and safe mediation techniques
to assist the parties to safely pursue mediation, and the support
for mediation in this context, Part III argues that the mediation
table is a more appropriate venue than the courtroom for Negev
Bedouin claims. Section A of Part III discusses why courts are not
the proper forum to consider issues imperative to reconciliation.
Section B addresses why the adversarial court system is ill-suited
124. See supra note 57 (discussing mediation as a process that will afford the
parties an opportunity to develop a viable solution and repair their
relationship).
125. See NONIE SHARP, No ORDINARY JUDGMENT: MABO, THE MURRAY
ISLANDERS' LAND CASE 103-14 (1996) (discussing the challenges of admitting
hearsay in Mabo).
126. See id. (describing the importance of oral evidence to native parties to
land disputes, as written evidence is often not available to support native claims).
127. See Cohan, supra note 20, at 181 (discussing the costs of mediation as
"relatively minor" in comparison to court costs); see also Osi, supra note 22, at
228 ("If an Indigenous or Aboriginal community decides to step into the judicial
fray, their national government should support or subsidize their costs. This may
be the only way they can mount a successful suit.").
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to protect indigenous needs. Section C contends that litigation
processes are not inherent to the Bedouin community. Finally,
Section D maintains that litigation is costly and often yields
disappointing results for indigenous communities.
A.

CourtsAre Unable to Address Issues that Are Imperative to
Reconciliation

Courts are equipped to address broad legal issues but
are often ill-suited to address non-legal issues, such as how
the Israeli government and the Bedouin community may
begin to repair their relationship and learn to peacefully
coexist.'28 Regardless of whether the Israeli government
and the Bedouin community select mediation or litigation,
the parties must work to repair their relationship, as the
parties will continue to coexist in the region. Mediation
would better serve this interest, as court decisions
emphasize past facts and not the ways in which parties may
move forward in the aftermath of a controversy.12 9
Therefore, mediation will offer the Israeli government and
Bedouin community the chance to mend their relationship
and would better position the parties to comply with the
terms of a settlement agreement.
B.

The Adversarial Court System Is Ill-Suited to Address
Indigenous Needs

The court system is fundamentally unfit to address the
special needs of indigenous persons. Courts are often structured
to benefit the majority population and consequently are unable
to adequately address minority needs. 3 0 Similarly, the law is often
unable to conform to the special needs of indigenous
128. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 57, at 518 (arguing that courts only
address broad legal issues and are unable to provide the parties with insight as to
how they might learn to coexist).
129. See id. ("The courts, for their part, are primarily concerned with
determining past facts rather than shaping future possibilities. This favors the
innocent, not the less powerful. Moreover, the courts are singularly
unconcerned with future relationships. The distributional cases that wind up in
court are handled pretty much like criminal cases-winners and losers are
identified-because that is what the courts are equipped to do.").
130. See supranote 111 and accompanying text (discussing the legislature and
judiciary's inability to address the unique needs of indigenous populations).
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communities because laws generally do not meet the needs of
external constituencies, like the Bedouin community.13 1
Court decisions, therefore, are not likely to acknowledge the
degree to which the preservation of land-based Bedouin
traditions depends on rights to their ancestral land.132 For this to
occur, the judiciary would need to acknowledge that Bedouin
litigants are in need of special legal attention and carve out
exceptions in property law for Bedouin litigants.1 33 The courts
are not in a position to do this, as is evident by the Bedouins'
previous failed attempts to claim title to ancestral land through
the Israeli court system.13 4 Given both the inability of the
Bedouins to provide the Israeli court system with official
documentation and the court's refusal to accept tribal
documentation, the Bedouins have repeatedly failed to gain title
to lands on which they live and their ancestors have lived.135
Therefore, the Bedouins would benefit from mediation processes
that would allow them to play a substantial role in reaching the
agreement, and not have a decision imposed on them by a court
system that is unable to recognize their unique evidentiary needs.
C.

LitigationIs Not Inherent to the Bedouin Community and
Indigenous Way of Life

Litigation is not inherent to indigenous communities
like the Negev Bedouin community. Members of these
communities are often inexperienced in and unfamiliar
with traditional court proceedings.1 36 To achieve maximum
131. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing how court systems
are ill-equipped to address many minority groups' needs, like those of
indigenous communities).
132. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (explaining that court
decisions are unlikely to acknowledge non-legal principles, such as the
importance of ancestral land to the Bedouin lifestyle, and cannot address
indigenous needs because courts are suited to accommodate majority, as
opposed to minority, claimants).
133. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (describing the court system as
ill-equipped to carve out special exceptions for minority groups, as courts are
created to address the needs of the majority).
134. See supra note 74 (discussing how Bedouins have repeatedly failed to be
granted land tide given their inability to provide official documentation and the Israeli
court system's inability to accept tribal documents).
135. See supra note 74.
136. See Chartrand, supra note 112, at ix ("In the eyes of some critics, the
courts are the government gizzard, which grinds up Aboriginal interests. Even
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results through litigation, the Negev Bedouins must first
accept, and learn to communicate in, the dominantjudicial
system before they can effectively formulate claims that
have merit and meet litigation standards. Naturally,
understanding and utilizing any foreign system is a timeconsuming process and should not be the exclusive means
of seeking justice when other non-adversarial processes,
such as mediation, exist and are better-suited for
indigenous claims.
D.

LitigationIs Costly for and Often DisappointsIndigenous
Communities

In addition to the inflexibility of court processes,
litigation may not be financially feasible for Bedouin
litigants, and given the inadequacies of courtroom
litigation in this context, the judiciary is likely to disappoint
indigenous parties on a quest to gain legal title. Alternative
are
mediation,
like
processes,
resolution
dispute
3 7 In
processes.'
litigation
than
significantly less expensive
the Israeli government-Negev Bedouin land dispute, the
Bedouin community might not be able to launch a
successful suit unless the Israeli Government subsidizes the
costs of litigation.1 38 In addition, a judicial decision may not
provide the parties with a sustainable solution, as courts are
unlikely to resolve practical issues or repair the relationship of
the parties. This decreases the chances of party compliance.' 39
Decisions issued by US courts support this notion; some US
courts, conceding that they are unable to hand down the
appropriate solution for a dispute between state and indigenous
the courts themselves have recently been at pains to emphasize that negotiation
is better than adjudication to resolve disputes."); see also Osi, supra note 22, at
219 (explaining indigenous persons' frustration with foreign judicial systems by
stating that "foreign-imposed court systems provided some relief in the past, but
they also frequently disappointed Indigenous or Aboriginal peoples.").
137. See Cohan, supra note 20, at 181 (discussing the costs of an ADR
process as "relatively minor" in comparison to court costs); see also Osi, supra
note 22 (noting the high costs of litigation and the financial hardship
indigenous communities would endure to launch a successful suit).
138. See supra note 137 (describing the high cost of litigation).
139. See supra note 123 (discussing how courts tend to address broad legal
issues and are unlikely to provide the parties with insight as to how they might
learn to coexist).
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party, have directed parties to pursue mediation.'4 The Israeli
government and Negev Bedouin should embrace the developing
trend to mediate disputes between government and indigenous
parties and engage in problem-solving approaches that are more
conducive to developing a viable solution.
In light of the advantages of mediation, the promise of
screening and safe mediation techniques, the support for
mediation to be used to resolve state-indigenous disputes, and
the disadvantages of court room processes, the Israeli
government and Negev Bedouins should pursue mediation to
resolve their dispute for the Negev Desert.
CONCLUSION
The Israeli government and Negev Bedouins should employ
mediation to resolve the Negev Desert land dispute. This conflict
is unlikely to resolve itself naturally, as the Bedouin population
4
reproduces at a rate that is among the highest in the world.' ' It
is in the best interest of both parties to work toward a sustainable
solution in a mutually safe and comfortable environment to
increase the chances of party compliance. The ADR process of
mediation will enable the parties to work toward a resolution
together and may simultaneously help the parties begin to repair
their historically contentious relationship.
The international community should encourage Israel, and
all other nations who neglect to uphold the rights of their
indigenous populations, to mediate pressing indigenous issues
and resolve these conflicts before they risk becoming grave
human rights issues. Given that the Consensus Building Institute
has expended valuable time and resources in the region to assess
the Israeli government-Negev Bedouin conflict and prepare the
parties for mediation, the Israeli government and the Negev
Bedouins are uniquely situated to begin mediation and develop a
140. See supra note 113 (noting that, in the past, the US court system has
refrained from ruling on government-native tribe cases, and has ordered the
native tribes and the government to enter into mediation to resolve their
dispute).
141. See Ruth Sinai, For the Bedouin, Freedom Means Having Nothing Left to
Lose, HAARETZ (Tel Aviv), Mar. 6, 2002, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/
("They
features/for-the-bedouin-freedom-means-having-nothing-left-to-lose-1.51170
have one of the highest birth rates in the world: about 5 percent a year in the
cities, and about 5.8 percent in the villages.").
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viable solution for their dispute over land. Given its position of
power, the Israeli government is better able to initiate action and
this Note therefore encourages the Israeli government to pursue
safe mediation to resolve the dispute for the Negev Desert and
work toward creating a lasting peace together with the Negev
Bedouins.

